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INTRODUCTION
The existence of a special Delaware statute' concerning
sequestration of stock in Delaware corporations was in the past
the subject of a detailed scholarly analysis.2 The novel feature
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. B.B.A. 1968, University of
Texas at El Paso; J.D. 1971, University of New Mexico; LL.M. 1973, Columbia Univer-
sity.
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides:
For all purposes of title, action; attachment, garnishment and jurisdic-
tion of all courts held in this State, but not for purpose of taxation, the situs
of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the
laws of this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall
be regarded as in this State.
See Folk and Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73
COLUM. L. Rav. 749 (1973).
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of the Delaware scheme is that it allows the attachment of the
stock in Delaware corporations for purposes of securing quasi
in rem jurisdiction 3 on a much broader basis than would be
possible under relevant portions of the Uniform Commercial
Code.4 If only the desirability and validity of the Delaware
statutes were involved, the excellent commentary on that sub-
ject already available5 would make further analysis repetitious
at best. However, recent decisions concerning the sequestration
statute by the Delaware Supreme Court in Greyhound Corp. v.
Heitner and by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg7 involve implications which reach
beyond both the borders of Delaware and the issue of stock
sequestration. The decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, I which reversed the Delaware Su-
preme Court, extends those implications even further. It is
probably not an overstatement to say that the decision in
Shaffer is one of the landmark jurisdictional decisions of the
past century.
Since the decisions of the state and federal courts in Dela-
3 This is the effect of the situs rule of DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974), supra note 1,
when coupled with the general attachment provisions of other sections of Delaware
law. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (a) (1974) provides:
If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the
defendant or any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State,
the Court may make an order directing such nonresident defendant or defen-
dants to appear by a day certain to be designated. Such order shall be served
on such nonresident defendant or defendants by mail or otherwise, if practic-
able, and shall be published in such manner as the Court directs, not less
than once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The Court may compel the appear-
ance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his property, which
property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the demand of the
plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear or otherwise defaults. (Emphasis
added).
U.C.C. § 8-317(1)(1972 version) provides:
No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest
evidenced thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the security is
actually seized by the officer making the attachment or levy but a security
which has been surrendered to the issuer may be attached or levied upon at
the source.
Delaware has never adopted the portion of the Code dealing with stock attach-
ments.
Folk and Moyer, supra note 2.
361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
7 540 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1976).
8 45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (1977).
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ware came to opposite conclusions, Supreme Court review of
one or both was inevitable. This article will attempt an analysis
of the two decisions as they emerged from the lower courts.
Particular attention will be paid to the question of whether the
two decisions are as incompatible as they appear on the surface
and to the handling of the Delaware case by the Supreme
Court. This article will assess the wisdom of the path chosen
by the Supreme Court, which severely restricted the traditional
breadth of quasi in rem jurisdiction, and it will discuss the
ramifications of such restrictions in areas other than that of
sequestration. The discussion will focus primarily on the sub-
stantive due process aspects of these jurisdictional theories, yet
most of the analysis and conclusions will have some relevancy
to new notions of procedural due process as well.
I. THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Early in 1976, the Delaware Supreme Court decided the
case of Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner. 9 The case involved a stock-
holders' derivative action against defendants who were serving
or had served as directors of Greyhound during a specified
period of time. 0 It was alleged on behalf of the corporation,
which was incorporated in Delaware, that the directors had
mismanaged the corporation to its detriment. More specifi-
cally, it was alleged that the directors had conducted them-
selves in a manner that exposed the corporation to antitrust
liability, and that as a result of that conduct the corporation
had been forced to pay antitrust damages." Since none of the
defendants were residents of Delaware, the action against them
was commenced by the sequestration of stock and stock options
they owned in Greyhound. Such sequestration was possible
under the Delaware statutory provisions despite the fact that
the physical presence of the stock was undoubtedly outside the
physical boundaries of Delaware. Of some twenty-seven direc-
tors named as parties defendant, the sequestration of stock
worked to bring in only nineteen, while sequestration of options
brought in two additional defendants. The other six either had
361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
' Id. at 228.
" Id. at 228-29.
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never owned stock in Greyhound or had sold their stock prior
to the commencement of the action.'
2
The heart of the argument by the directors, an argument
which was to prevail in the Supreme Court and which will be
the primary focus -of this article, was that since none of the
defendants had sufficient contact with Delaware for that state
to exercise in personam jurisdiction over them constitutionally,
neither could the state constitutionally exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction over them via sequestration, because such action
would violate defendants' due process rights. 3 The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, squarely rejected this contention.
Taking a stand based primarily on the history of the quasi in
rem jurisdictional basis, the court held that such jurisdiction
was based not on any contact which the forum had with the
defendants, but on the contact which it had with the stock in
the Delaware corporation."4 At this point no attempt will be
made to analyze the legal rationale for the decision other than
to note that it was based on traditional territorialist notions of
jurisdiction founded in early American cases. Since the effect
of those early precedents will be pivotal in examining the Third
Circuit decision concerning sequestration and in examining the
review of the Delaware Supreme Court decision by the United
States Supreme Court, extended discussion will be postponed
for the time.
An opposite result concerning the constitutionality of the
Delaware sequestration statute was reached by the Third Cir-
cuit in U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Gregg.15 In that case, Gregg, a
Florida domiciliary, had entered into a contract in Florida with
U.S. Industries (U.S.I.), a Delaware corporation having its
principal place of business in New York. Pursuant to the con-
tract, Gregg transferred to U.S.I. all of his stock in three Flor-
ida construction companies, one million dollars in cash, and a
note for a half million dollars. In return Gregg received from
U.S.I. a large block of U.S.I. common and preferred stock; The
assets of the Gregg corporations were transferred from U.S.I. to
22 Ownership of stock in the corporation is not necessary in order to serve as a
director. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(b) (1974).
,1 361 A.2d at 229.
14 Id.
Is 540 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1976).
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Diversicon, a Florida corporation with its principal place of
business in Florida. Gregg helped in Diversicon's operation of
the construction companies.
Subsequent to this transaction, U.S.I. and Diversicon be-
came dissatisfied with the dealings. Alleging that Gregg had
misled them in setting up the original transaction and that he
had violated his duties as an officer of Diversicon by taking for
himself business opportunities which should have gone to Div-
ersicon, U.S.I. and Diversicon instituted suit against Gregg in
Delaware state court, and proceeded by attaching the stock
which Gregg owned in U.S.I.'6 Following removal to federal
district court," Gregg objected to the sequestration of his stock
on the grounds that he lacked sufficient contact with Delaware
for that state to exercise jurisdiction over him. The argument
advanced by Gregg was like that seen in Shaffer,'" viz., since
the state lacked in personam jurisdiction over him, it could not
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over him through the seques-
tration of his stock. Gregg was able to make very compelling
arguments based on the fact that his stock certificates were
physically located in Florida and had been pledged as collat-
eral for a bank loan in Florida. Despite this fact, however, the
federal district court ruled that such sequestration was permis-
sible,'9 relying on much of the same authority used by the Dela-
ware Supreme Court in Shaffer to conclude that in personam
jurisdictional restrictions had no relevance to a case in which
jurisdiction was predicated upon quasi in rem theories. 0
The federal district court's decision in Gregg is clearly con-
sistent with the holding of the Delaware Supreme Court in
Shaffer. The federal opinion was, however, reversed on appeal
"U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D. Del. 1972).
' U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 58 F.R.D. 469 (D. Del. 1973).
"Both the Delaware Supreme Court decision and the United States Supreme
Court decision will be referred to hereinafter by this single name.
" 348 F. Supp. at 1020.
' It might also be noted that, in addition to holding that Gregg's substantive due
process objections were unfounded, the court rejected Gregg's arguments for proce-
dural due process safeguards based on the line of cases beginning with Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). The basic thrust of Gregg's argument was that
there should have been notice and a hearing prior to the attachment.
The application of Sniadach protections to quasi in rem jurisdiction was rejected
by the Third Circuit in Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Fin. Co., 456 F.2d 979 (3rd
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972).
1977]
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to the Third Circuit.2' The court unanimously ruled that the in
personam jurisdictional standards required by the line of cases
beginning with International Shoe Co. v. Washington 2 pre-
cluded Delaware* from exercising jurisdiction over either Gregg
or Gregg's stock. The gist of the opinion was that if the state
could not constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction, it
could not gain adjudicatory authority simply by changing the
label of the jurisdictional base to quasi in rem.23 This holding
meant that the Delaware sequestration scheme was violative of
due process as applied to the facts in Gregg. It was unneces-
sary, therefore, for the Third Circuit to reach Gregg's conten-
tions concerning procedural due process or a constitutional re-
quirement of a limited appearance rule.24
This was the fact situation as it existed prior to the review
of Shaffer by the United States Supreme Court. The Delaware
courts had decided that the due process standards applicable
to in personam jurisdiction were inapplicable to quasi in rem
cases and had upheld the sequestration statute as applied in
Shaffer. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, had concluded
that the in personam due process standards applied to all juris-
dictional exercises, regardless of the label of the'theory, and
had held the sequestration statute unconstitutional as applied
in Gregg. Both cases involved sufficient amounts of money that
application for Supreme Court review was inevitable. 25 Before
it is possible to analyze the holding of the United States Su-
preme Court in Shaffer, however, it is first necessary to exam-
ine the theoretical underpinnings of the two conflicting lower
court decisions.
II. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE DELAWARE
PROCEDURE
There is certainly nothing unique in the Delaware statu-
tory scheme providing for quasi in rem jurisdiction. The theo-
21 540 F.2d 142 (3rd Cir. 1976).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 540 F.2d at 154.
2, Id. at 156.
21 Because of the way the lower court decisions evolved, Supreme Court review of
both would be by appeal rather than by writ of certiorari. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(2),
1257(1).
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retical concept of such jurisdiction has firm roots in American
jurisprudence, as every law student who has ever struggled
with Harris v. Balk 6 can testify. The basic notion is that a state
which has control over a thing can adjudicate the rights of
parties in that thing. If the rights of the entire world in the
thing are adjudicated, the case is in rem;2 if only the rights of
certain named parties in the thing are adjudicated, the pro-
ceeding is one quasi in rem.2 All of this is simple enough so long
as the thing is a tangible object and the rights being asserted
arise from the thing itself. Matters become considerably more
complex, however, when quasi in rem jurisdiction is applied to
intangibles which by definition lack a physical existence and
hence cannot be said to be more clearly located in one place
than in another. Further complications arise when the claim
being asserted does not relate to the property which has been
attached for jurisdictional purposes.29 In the discussion which
follows no distinction will be made between tangibles and in-
tangibles. It will, however, be necessary to distinguish between
claims arising from the thing and claims unrelated to the
thing."
A. The Situs Rule
If there is anything unique about the Delaware statutory
scheme at issue in Shaffer and Gregg, it is the rule that stock
in a Delaware corporation is always deemed to have its situs
for sequestration purposes in Delaware. Such a rule is contrary
to the basic Uniform Commercial Code provision which re-
quires physical presence of the stock for attachment1.3 Had
2S 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
21 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 2 (1942).
n Id. § 3.
21 The difficult case of attachment of an intangible to satisfy a claim unrelated to
that intangible is that of the casebook favorite, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
Harris owed Balk $180. Balk owed Epstein $300. Harris and Balk were domiciled in
North Carolina; Epstein was domiciled in Maryland. While Harris was temporarily in
Maryland, Epstein garnished the debt which Harris owed to Balk. Harris paid the
money to Epstein. Upon his return to North Carolina, Harris was sued for the debt by
Balk. Harris defended, noting payment to Epstein in Maryland pursuant to Maryland
judgment. This defense was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.
31 Since all in rem actions arise from the thing by definition, the portion of the
discussion which concludes that quasi in rem actions arising from the thing are usually
constitutionally permissible will also be applicable to in rem actions.
31 U.C.C. § 8-317(1) (1972 version).
19771
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Delaware followed the U.C.C. on that point, there would have
been no sequestration in either case since the stock in both
Shaffer and Gregg was physically located outside Delaware.
Yet, although the United States Supreme Court in review-
ing either Shaffer or Gregg could have seized upon the Dela-
ware situs rule as a means of escaping the difficult issues of
jurisdictional theory, the Court refused to decide Shaffer on
this basis.12 That the Court declined to take the easier route
seems to have been inevitable since the Court had previously
upheld the situs provision of the Delaware statute in Ownbey
v. Morgan.3 3 Even the Third Circuit in its decision in Gregg
took the position that there was nothing invalid in the provi-
sion fixing the situs of stock in Delaware for sequestration pur-
poses.34 In addition, the Supreme Court allowed to stand and
cited with approval the brilliant opinion of the California Su-
preme Court in Atkinson v. Superior Court,35 in which quasi in
rem jurisdiction was upheld even though exercised over an in-
tangible which clearly had its situs outside the physical bound-
aries of California.
B. The Lack of a Limited Appearance Rule
Some states have a limited appearance rule which makes
it possible for the defendant in a quasi in rem action to appear
and defend the case on the merits without submitting himself
to the in personam jurisdiction of the forum. 6 Should the
plaintiff prevail in such a case his recovery is limited to the
property involved. Should he later proceed again against the
defendant on the same claim (assuming that the property in-
volved in the first action was insufficient to satisfy the total
claim), the decision for him in the first action would be of no
benefit for either res judicata or collateral estoppel purposes.37
If the defendant prevails in the first action, he is protected only
in regard to the property involved in the first action. Thus, in
2 45 U.S.L.W. at 4856 n.38.
33 256 U.S. 94 (1920).
540 F.2d at 147.
316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
' For a discussion of limited appearances, see Note, The "Right" to Defend Fed-
eral Quasi in Rem Actions Without Submitting to the Personal Jurisdiction of the
Court, 48 IOWA L. Ray. 441 (1963).
3 Id. at 449.
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states allowing a limited appearance, the preclusive effects of
a judgment in the quasi in rem action are quite limited.
No such appearance was available to the defendants in
either Shaffer or Gregg, however, since Delaware does not allow
a limited appearance. 8 The district court held in Gregg that
the federal court was bound to follow the Delaware state rule
on the availability of a limited appearance as to those issues
in the case involving state law.3 The district court further con-
cluded that, although it was not required to do so, it would also
follow the state limited appearance rule in regard to those is-
sues in the case which involved federal law.4" Gregg faced a
difficult decision as a result of the federal district court's hold-
ing on the limited appearance issue: If he appeared to contest
the merits of U.S.I.'s claim, he would be submitting to in
personam jurisdiction whereby any judgment rendered against
him could far exceed the value of the stock attached;41 if, on
the other hand, Gregg did not appear to contest the merits of
the claim, a default would be entered against him and the stock
would be lost.42 Confronted with a no-win situation Gregg chose
the lesser of two evils: He refused to answer and a default
judgment was entered against him. 3 A similar dilemma faced
the directors whose stock was attached in Shaffer since the
potential liability in that suit far exceeded the value of the
stock attached. Like Gregg, the directors in Shaffer could de-
fend their claim to the stock and thereby subject themselves
to excess liability or they could refuse to defend the stock and
it would be lost pursuant to a default judgment. In both cases
it would be fair to say that the practical options open to the
defendants were extremely limited.
That Gregg chose to default rather than face a full in
personam trial on the merits in Delaware is not surprising.
Both he and the claim involved in the case were so unconnected
with Delaware that it is difficult to conceive of a more inappro-
' Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 117 A.2d 355 (Del. 1965).
58 F.R.D. at 476.
' Id. at 477.
' The total claim originally stated by U.S.I. against Gregg was for $20,000,000.
540 F.2d at 145.
11 The stock involved had been valued by the Florida bank which accepted it as
collateral at $2,066,333.62. Id.
11 58 F.R.D. at 481.
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priate place for the trial of the action. Given the facts in the
case it should be clear (and indeed no one seems ever to have
questioned this conclusion) that the state of Delaware could
not constitutionally have exercised in personam jurisdiction
over Gregg. The question which then must be faced is whether
that state can attempt to coerce an in personam appearance by
the seizure of valuable assets of such an unconnected defen-
dant. That coercion of such an appearance by the defendant is
the purpose of the Delaware sequestration scheme is extremely
clear from the statute itself.44
There will be no attempt in this article to see if the di-
lemma faced by Gregg could have been avoided by a holding
that a limited appearance rule was constitutionally required.
Certainly nothing in the United States Supreme Court decision
in Shaffer even hints at such a conclusion. The requirement of
such a rule was one of the arguments advanced by Gregg in the
Third Circuit, but it was not ruled on by that court. Similar
arguments were rejected by the federal district court in Gregg"
and by the Delaware Supreme Court in Shaffer"5 and in Sands
v. Lefcourt Realty Corp.47 All of the decisions rejecting that
argument have used as their basis the early United States Su-
preme Court case of York v. Texas,4" which held that there was
no constitutional right to make a special appearance in an in
personam case even in light of an especially deceptive Texas
statutory scheme.
There is, however, some doubt as to whether York would
be followed any longer,49 and certainly portions of its reasoning
have since been rejected." It might further be argued that even
if York is still good law, its rationale does not justify the denial
of a limited appearance in quasi in rem cases: The defendant
who has no special appearance opportunity in an in personam
case still has the possibility of collateral attack when the judg-
< DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974), reprinted supra note 3.
4 58 F.R.D. at 481.
" 361 A.2d at 236.
'T 117 A.2d 365 (Del. 1955).
49 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
" Folk and Moyer, supra note 2, at 789 et seq.
Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915), rejects
the notion that it is only the execution of a judgment, not its rendering, which may be
violative of due process.
[Vol. 66
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ment is sought to be enforced, and he will prevail if his conten-
tion of lack of jurisdiction is correct, provided that the issue of
jurisdiction was not litigated in the first proceeding; the defen-
dant who is precluded from a limited appearance where juris-
diction is on a quasi in rem basis, however, will suffer the loss
of the attached property and lacks any possibility of collateral
attack. Although a holding constitutionally requiring a limited
appearance would have been another means by which the Su-
preme Court could have avoided the more difficult issues in
Shaffer, the Court chose not to so hold." The Supreme Court
was probably correct in refusing to read such a limited appear-
ance option into the requirement of due process since limited
appearance rules are much criticized as wasteful of judicial
resources5 2 and appear to exist in only a minority of states
today.
With this background information, it is evident that the
Supreme Court was left in reviewing either Shaffer or Gregg
with only the most difficult issue of the cases before it. The
Court was unwilling to strike down the situs rule, and the Court
could not require a limited appearance without being on un-
sound policy grounds. The Court, therefore, had no choice but
to confront the basic philosophical differences between the two
cases; in particular, the Court was forced to address the funda-
mental problem of the extent to which modem notions of due
process interact with traditional theories of jurisdiction. Before
the basic question of whether modem notions of due process
add to or restrict the traditional bases of jurisdiction can be
understood and the Supreme Court decision in Shaffer fully
appreciated, some background discussion of early theories of
jurisdiction, both quasi in rem and in personam, is necessary.
TII. TERRITORIAL ASPECTS OF JURISDICTION
In great measure, historical approaches to judicial juris-
diction were firmly based on the physical existence of the
forum state. The basic concept was that the state had an inher-
ent ability to exercise judicial control over persons, things, and
events which were located within the boundaries of the state.
, 45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (1977).
52 Folk and Moyer, supra note 2, at 794.
Note, supra note 36.
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This idea of physical control influenced not only the develop-
ment of in rem jurisdiction and, in turn, quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion, but was also crucial in early exercises of in personam
jurisdiction.
Even as late as 100 years ago, there were major cases in the
United States Supreme Court basing the in personam jurisdic-
tional powers of the state on the physical presence of individu-
als. As of that time, in personam jurisdiction existed only if the
individual defendant had been personally served while within
the confines of the state or had voluntarily appeared in the
action against him. The holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Pennoyer v. Neff4 was that an attempt by the state
to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of such connections vio-
lated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
It is probable that the notion of the existence of in
personam power based on personal service within the state can
be traced to the common law writ of capias ad respondendum
by which a civil defendant could be jailed pending trial. 8 Since
the expansion of the early theories of in personam jurisdiction
into their modem forms is familiar to all lawyers, no attempt
will be made to detail that expansion; for present purposes it
is sufficient to say that until the beginning of this century,
jurisdiction in personam was available only in restricted cir-
cumstances. It might also be noted that although the restric-
tions were removed by a gradual evolutionary process, it is only
in the 30 years since International Shoe Co. v. Washington57
that a really drastic break has been made with the philosophi-
cal territorialist underpinnings of Pennoyer. It is indeed ironi-
cal that the final demise of these territorialist underpinnings
came exactly 100 years after the Pennoyer decision as the ulti-
mate result of the Supreme Court decision in Shaffer.
Given the fact that in personam jurisdiction was until re-
cently so limited, it is hardly mysterious that other jurisdic-
tional theories were developed in an effort to supplement it.
The concept of adjudicating the rights of the world in things
- 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
" The history of the capias is discussed at length in Fox, Process of Imprisonment
at Common Law, 39 L.Q. Rsv. 46 (1923).
57 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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within the physical control of the forum was well known from
common law in rem jurisdiction. 8 And if a court could adjudi-
cate such rights in a thing, why should it not have the less
objectionable ability to adjudicate the rights of a more limited
number of persons in that thing? Such adjudication is, of
course, a quasi in rem proceeding.
An adjudication of the rights of the named parties in the
thing could be done by a court in either of two settings. The
first would involve the determination of the rights of the parties
in the thing on a claim arising from the thing. Such an action
would be exemplified in a suit to remove a cloud on a title. As
to a claim arising from the thing, the action is truly quasi in
rem in the sense that it does more closely resemble an in rem
proceeding than an in personam proceeding. The second type
of adjudication would determine the rights of the named par-
ties in the thing on a claim not arising from the thing. This
second type of adjudication is exemplified by Harris v. Balk,
in which the right asserted by Epstein to the $180 owed by
Harris to Balk did not arise from that $180 but rather from a
separate debt of some $300 which Balk owed Epstein.59 As to a
claim not arising from the thing, the action has also been tradi-
tionally labeled quasi in rem. The label is misleading, however,
since such an action is actually quasi in personam because it
resembles more closely an in personam action than an in rem
action.
Both sorts of quasi in rem adjudications were allowed be-
cause of the state's interest in things which were physically
located within its boundaries. As to claims arising from the
thing, such jurisdiction is justifiable due to the interest which
the state has in deciding conflicting claims to the thing.' As
" Jurisdiction in rem had its roots in the admiralty jurisdiction of the English
courts. For a discussion of such jurisdiction, see Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Regis-
tration, 55 N.E. 812 (Mass. 1900).
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
' As to such claims, many states now assert in personam jurisdiction over persons
with conflicting interests in the thing. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCE-
DURE ACT § 1.03 (1962) provides that:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts di-
rectly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from
the person's
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to claims not arising from the thing, the state arguably has no
such interest since the adjudication regarding the thing is sim-
ply an adjunct to the decision regarding the underlying, unre-
lated controversy between the named parties. The only similar-
ity in the two instances is that in both cases the state has
physical control over the thing.
In brief summary, then, the concept known as quasi in rem
jurisdiction gave the state adjudicatory authority over a group
of cases which could not have been adjudicated in personam
due to the restrictive territorialist notions associated with that
doctrine. The two classes of cases involved real quasi in rem
fact patterns and quasi in personam fact patterns depending
upon the source of the rights asserted. The second class of cases
gave what was in reality an expanded in personam power at a
time when, without such fictions, expansion was impossible.
Although legal scholars are well-known for wanting to
dwell on historical trivialities, this discussion about the territo-
rialist aspects of early judicial jurisdiction is not without pur-
pose. The major point is that a portion of the jurisdiction which
is now called quasi in rem developed to provide a much needed
expansion of in personam jurisdiction during a time period
when territorialist fictions were necessary to justify expansions
of jurisdiction. 1 The real question involved in Shaffer and
Gregg, therefore, was whether such fictions could survive after
the need for them seemed to have faded away. Keeping in mind
that quasi in rem jurisdiction has been used to adjudicate
claims unrelated to the thing as well as claims arising from the
thing, can that jurisdictional theory still be used consistently
with modern due process notions of in personam jurisdiction?
This is the subject to which the Supreme Court addressed itself
in Shaffer. Before it is possible to consider directly the Su-
preme Court treatment of that case, however, it is necessary to
(5) having an interest in, using, or poisessing real property in this
state ....
e, The use of a fiction to accomplish such expansion is neither unusual nor surpris-
ing. For a discussion of such fictions, see Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338,
340-41 (1953). See also Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
Such devices were used in the actual expansion of in personam jurisdiction over
domiciliaries of the forum and included the implied consent ideas in cases involving
motorists. Hess v. Pawloski, 275 U.S. 352 (1927).
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examine the applicable modem theories of jurisdiction and due
process.
IV. MODERN NOTIONS OF JURISDICTION In Personam
The traditional notions of in personam jurisdiction were in
great part derived from those legislative jurisdictional theories
which once controlled choice of law thinking in the United
States.62 In both the area of conflicts (legislative jurisdiction)
and that of judicial jurisdiction, there has been a turning away
from basic territorialist foundations. In the conflicts area, the
vested rights philosophy is increasingly rejected as states strive
to apply their own law to persons outside their boundaries and
to events occurring physically outside their boundaries. 3 This
trend is undoubtedly motivated by the recognition that states
do have legitimate interests in persons and events outside their
own borders.
What is true in regard to legislative jurisdiction has also
proved to be true for judicial jurisdiction. Since the time of
Pennoyer, states have attempted to broaden their jurisdic-
tional bases in responses to fundamental changes in American
society. With increased mobility and commerce, it is no longer
possible for states simply to exercise in personam jurisdiction
on the rigid territorialist bases of Pennoyer. The outer dimen-
sions of this expanding body of law have been, and will con-
tinue to be, set by United States Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of due process. Without attempting to detail this trend
of expansion, it is sufficient to note that instead of relying on
fiction, the Court has allowed expanded in personam jurisdic-
tion on the basis of examinations of the underlying policies
relevant to particular fact patterns. 4
" That legislative jurisdiction theories once controlled choice of law thinking in
the United States is evidenced by the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws
(1934).
11 For a discussion of the various "interest analysis" theories, see Leathers,
Dimensions of the Constitutional Obligation to Provide a Forum, 62 Ky. L.J. 1 (1973).
" McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
It is not necessary to detail the dimensions of those tests which have emerged since
it is clear that the state of Delaware could not constitutionally have exercised in
personam jurisdiction over Gregg.
Similar constitutional objections to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over
the defendant directors in Shaffer were made, and it is clear from the Supreme Court's
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Yet, the constitutional allowance of expanded in personam
jurisdiction is not self-implementing. For a state to have long
arm jurisdiction over any case it must have a long arm statute
authorizing such jurisdiction; moreover, that statute, as ap-
plied to the fact pattern at hand, must comply with the sub-
stantive due process dimensions set by the Supreme Court.
However, to say that a state could constitutionally exercise in
personam jurisdiction through these means is not to say that
it must exercise such jurisdiction. 5 Certainly a state could still
limit its personal jurisdictional powers to the traditional bases
outlined in Pennoyer. Yet the trend has been to expand these
bases. At issue in both Gregg and Shaffer is how that trend in
the area of personal jurisdiction affects quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion. Strangely enough, with preliminary matters out of the
way the answer to the question is not as difficult as it might at
first appear. Indeed, the answer is so clear-cut that there was
no dissent in the United States Supreme Court on the issue of
the application of modern constitutional due process standards
to quasi in rem jurisdiction.6
V. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION: Shaffer v.
Heitner
As was noted in the discussion of the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Shaffer, the directors who were defendants
in that action were placed in a no-win situation: The only way
they could protect their stock interest was to enter a general
appearance in Delaware, which would subject them to full in
personam jurisdiction; if, on the other hand, they chose not to
make such an appearance, a default judgment would be en-
tered against them and their stock would be lost. The defen-
holding in that case that those objections were deemed correct by the majority. This
appears to be a departure from conventional wisdom. For the moment, it is sufficient
to assume that Delaware could not constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant directors. That premise will be examined at length when the dis-
senting portion of the Shaffer opinion is discussed. See text accompanying notes 80-
92 infra; Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 U.S.L.W. 4849, 4858 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
'5 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
" 45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (1977). The opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan concurs on the
theoretical aspects of applying minimum contacts requirements to quasi in rem juris-
diction; his dissent concerns the application of the theory to the fact pattern at hand.
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dants sought to escape the dilemma by filing a motion to quash
service of process and to vacate the sequestration order of the
Delaware courts. This motion was denied by the Court of
Chancery of Delaware in a decision which was upheld by the
Delaware Supreme Court. 7
Despite the fact that the denial of these motions was not
a final decision on the merits of the underlying controversy, the
United States Supreme Court took jurisdiction of the appeal
due to the fact that the state decisions were final on the crucial
federal issue." The Court reversed the decision of the Delaware
courts, finding that since the state could not constitutionally
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the defendant directors,
the state was constitutionally barred from exercising quasi in
rem jurisdiction over them as well. The holding very clearly
indicates that the relevant test for determining the constitu-
tionality of exercises of quasi in rem jurisdiction will be found
in the due process standards of in personam cases beginning
with International Shoe Co. v. Washington." The rationale of
the Court's decision was that modern developments in the area
of in personam jurisdiction were relevant to continued exercises
of quasi in rem jurisdiction, at least where the claims being
adjudicated did not arise from the thing which was involved
(quasi in personam jurisdiction).
A. Applying In Personam Jurisdictional Standards to Quasi
in Rem Proceedings
The careful distinctions which had once existed between
in personam jurisdiction and quasi in rem jurisdiction had
blurred to a considerable extent in the years preceding Shaffer.
As was pointed out by the Third Circuit in Gregg, the United
States Supreme Court had previously held in Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank that for purposes of notice of a pending
action, no distinction was to be drawn between cases based on
different types of jurisdiction.7 As a result of that decision, the
type of notice previously used in the in personam jurisdictional
cases is also required in both quasi in rem and in rem cases.
Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
" Shaffer v. Heitner, 45 U.S.L.W. 4849 (1977).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
71 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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The Supreme Court recognized in Mullane that the presump-
tion that a property owner was always in possession of his prop-
erty was a fiction which could not survive modem standards of
basic fairness," particularly in light of one peculiar fact in that
case. 2 The Third Circuit in Gregg therefore concluded that this
requirement of identical notice regardless of the jurisdictional
basis meant that jurisdiction should not be exercised quasi in
rem if jurisdiction could not be exercised in personam.13 The
Supreme Court in Shaffer also seized upon the theory of
Mullane to illustrate the blurred distinctions between the var-
ious types of jurisdiction and stated:
The law of state court jurisdiction no longer stands securely
on the foundation established in Pennoyer. We think that the
time is ripe to consider whether the standard of fairness and
substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should be
held to govern actions in rem as well as in personam.4
Although the holding in Mullane was a significant factor
in the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court in Shaffer,5
Mullane did not in itself require that the Court go as far as it
did in Shaffer. When taken alone, the fact that the notice stan-
dards are the same in both in personam and in rem actions is
a rather slender thread upon which to base the Shaffer holding.
Although the distinction between theories may have become
blurred and meaningless for purposes of notice, it would be
extending that development too far to use it as the sole basis
on which to overrule settled jurisdictional law. Thus Mullane
merely furnishes an underlying philosophy for the result in
Shaffer.
A better case upon which to base the abolition of any dis-
tinction between quasi in rem and in personam jurisdiction is
" Id. at 316.
72 Id. The peculiar fact was that the adversary of the trust beneficiaries was the
trustee itself. Hence, seizure or attachment, which would normally alert the party in
custody of the thing, would serve no purpose since the party in custody was the
adversary of the party seeking protection.
11 540 F.2d at 156.
" 45 U.S.L.W. at 4855.
It might be well to note at this time that the Court in its decision in Shaffer
discussed at all points the concepts of both quasi in rem and in rem under the single
heading of in rem.
75 Id.
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that of the California Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Superior
Court.7" In that decision, written by Justice Traynor, the Cali-
fornia court was faced with a situation in which California was
unable, due to shortcomings in its then-existing long arm stat-
ute, to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a suit by mem-
bers of a union to stop payment of portions of their wages to a
trust fund being administered by a New York trustee.77 This
was an unfortunate situation since the members of the union
were domiciled in California and the payments were being
made by their employers from California to the New York trus-
tee pursuant to the directions of their union. California law
indicated that the trustee was necessary to the adjudication of
the controversy, but long arm jurisdiction over the trustee was
statutorily unavailable." Further, under traditional law the
situs of the trust would have been New York.7 Despite those
obstacles, the California Supreme Court held that quasi in rem
jurisdiction could be exercised by California so as to adjudicate
the rights of all parties, including the trustee, in the trust. In
so doing, the California court held that since the trust had
minimum contacts with the forum, such quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion was available and permissible. Atkinson indicates, there-
fore, that the in personam jurisdictional standards do apply to
actions quasi in rem and, despite the lack of United States
Supreme Court review of the California decision, Atkinson
furnishes some support for the holdings in both Shaffer and
Gregg.
Also to be noted about the Atkinson decision is the fact
that an exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the trustee
would have been constitutionally permissible had California
not lacked an adequate long arm statute. This is clearly im-
plicit in the holding of the California Supreme Court regarding
minimum contacts with California. This means that in a situa-
tion in which in personam jurisdiction would have been consti-
1' 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1959). Yet, despite the strength afforded by Atkinson, the
decision received only passing notice from the Supreme Court in Shaffer. 45 U.S.L.W.
at 4854.
71 316 P.2d at 965. Since that decision, California has adopted a long arm statute
which extends to the full range of due process. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West
1973).
11 316 P.2d at 966.
71 Id. at 963. The Court pointed out that intangibles actually had no situs.
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tutionally permitted had the statutory requirements been met,
the state of California chose instead to exercise quasi in rem
jurisdiction. It is this aspect of Atkinson which is crucial in the
formulation of a new theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction com-
patible with modern developments in the area of substantive
due process. It is to be hoped that such a new theory will be
the direct outgrowth of the decision of the Supreme Court in
Shaffer.
B. Delaware Directors and Judicial Jurisdiction
In light of the foregoing discussion, it is necessary at this
point to devote attention to the portion of the Supreme Court's
decision in Shaffer which appears to conclude that the state of
Delaware could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction in any
form over the directors of Greyhound." In all fairness, it would
not be possible to characterize the majority opinion in this area
as better than muddled. Thus, it is possible to read Shaffer as
indicative of either of two holdings. At the outset, it is clear
that in Shaffer the Supreme Court did strike down the attempt
by the state to exert jurisdiction, and it is equally clear that
the result hinged somehow on the in personam notions of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington. Identifying the ration-
ale for this result is more difficult. The holding is only possible
on two bases. The first is that the Court felt Delaware could
not constitutionally exercise in personam jurisdiction over cor-
porate directors in a stockholders' derivative action since the
state lacked minimum contacts with the defendants. This is
the reading given the majority opinion both by Mr. Justice
Brennan and by this writer. The second possible holding is that
the Court felt that there is a constitutional preference for in
personam jurisdiction; therefore if Delaware had the permissi-
ble option of using in personam jurisdiction, it was constitu-
tionally required to do so over other jurisdictional forms. 8'
The Court's apparent recognition that it would have been
possible for Delaware to enact a long arm statute which would
This has been identified as the holding of the Court based on this writer's
reading of the opinion, and was arrived at, in great part, from observing the dissenting
reaction of Mr. Justice Brennan to the result of the facts peculiar to Shaffer. 45
U.S.L.W. 4849, 4858 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
as Folk and Moyer, supra note 2, at 798.
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have reached these defendants is supportive of the second pos-
sible holding (preference for in personam jurisdiction). For in-
stance, the Court noted at one point that "[i]f Delaware per-
ceived its interest in securing jurisdiction over corporate fidu-
ciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we would expect it
to have enacted a statute more clearly designed to protect that
interest. '8 2 Later the Court observed that "Delaware, unlike
some states, has not enacted a statute that treats acceptance
of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State."8 3 The
Court seems to have further acknowledged the interest of Dela-
ware in securing jurisdiction over the corporate defendants
when it observed that:
The interest appellee has identified may support the applica-
tion of Delaware law to resolve any controversy over appel-
lant's actions in their capacities as officers and directors. But
we have rejected the argument that if a State's law can pro-
perly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have juris-
diction over the parties to that dispute. 4
Of this interaction between due process controls over choice of
law (legislative jurisdiction) and due process controls over ju-
risdiction (judicial jurisdiction), more will be said later.8 5 For
the present it is sufficient to observe that the implication of the
Court that the state could have applied a long arm statute to
this fact pattern seems to refute the portion of the possible
holding that the defendants lacked minimum contacts with the
state. This, in turn, would mean that the striking of Delaware's
exercise of jurisdiction was based upon a constitutional prefer-
ence for in personam jurisdiction.
Despite these facts, such a preference should not be read
into Shaffer. Certainly there is nothing specific in Shaffer to
indicate this preference and such a reading ought not be given
to a decision which is easily capable of explanation on the more
familiar grounds of lack of minimum contacts. It would also be
a mistake to choose such a dubious construction in light of the
fact that one Court member, Mr. Justice Brennan, did not at
all identify such a possibility. Lastly, it should be noted that
45 U.S.L.W. at 4857.
'Id.
m Id.
m See text accompanying notes 132-43 infra.
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all the language implying such a preference comes in a portion
of the opinion in which the majority is making light of the
Delaware interest in the litigation. The majority itself noted
that "Delaware law bases jurisdiction not on appellants' status
as corporate fiduciaries, but rather on the presence of their
property in the State."8
It would seem correct, therefore, to conclude that the
Court felt that the defendants lacked minimum contacts with
Delaware and hence that the State could not constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over them in any form. Yet, this particular
conclusion, as applied to the facts of Shaffer, is open to consid-
erable question. In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan
observed,,"I am convinced that as a general rule a state forum
has jurisdiction to adjudicate a shareholder derivative action
centering on the conduct and policies of the directors and offi-
cers of a corporation chartered by that State. 87 This conclu-
sion seems especially defensible since in any such action the
ultimate recovery will run to the corporation rather than di-
rectly to the benefit of the plaintiff shareholders. The wrong
complained of in such a suit is a wrong to the corporation and
if the corporation has been harmed, it would seem to be within
the control of the chartering state to provide a forum to redress
such a harm. Yet, the majority in Shaffer observed, drawing
upon language from Hanson v. Denckla,8 that the directors in
this case had not "purposefully availed themselves of the privi-
lege of conducting activities within the forum state." 9 The
conclusion of the Court was that "it strains reason . . . to
suggest that anyone buying securities in a corporation formed
in Delaware 'impliedly consents' to subject himself to Dela-
ware's . . .jurisdiction on any cause of action."9 While this
conclusion would certainly be true in regard to an ordinary
stockholder, such as the defendant in Gregg, it does not seem
to be necessarily true when the stockholder is also a director of
the corporation. In fact, as is suggested by Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, a corporate director is in a position of trust to the corpora-
"6 45 U.S.L.W. at 4857.
Id. at 4859 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
357 U.S. 235 (1958).
45 U.S.L.W. at 4857.
"Id.
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tion and any breaches of that trust should be redressed in the
chartering state." This point would seem to be implicit in the
majority's recognition of the fact that it is Delaware law which
would govern the obligation of the directors to the corporation
if they were subjected to the state's jurisdiction.2 Thus, the
Court was incorrect in its conclusion that the directors lacked
minimum contacts with Delaware in regard to the suit at hand.
C. Some Conclusory Remarks
It is to be concluded from the preceeding discussion that
under no circumstances should the results in both Shaffer and
Gregg have been the same. Gregg represents a classic situation
in which any exercise of in personam jurisdiction would have
been constitutionally impermissible. In such a case, therefore,
any attempt to exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction would be
equally objectionable on constitutional grounds. On the other
hand, Shaffer appears to be a case in which in personam juris-
diction should have been constitutionally available, yet one in
which such an exercise was impossible because of the lack of a
Delaware long arm statute designed to reach such facts. In that
circumstance, it would appear that the Delaware courts were
properly using their quasi in rem sequestration scheme to se-
cure in personam jurisdiction in a circumstance where such
jurisdiction was constitutionally permissible but statutorily
unavailable.
The theoretical underpinnings of both Shaffer and Gregg
are the same. In this respect, the Supreme Court decision was
correct. It is for that reason that Mr. Justice Brennan did not
dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which applied
the test of International Shoe to quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Moreover, what has probably evolved from Shaffer and Gregg
is the basis for a new theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction which
recognizes the two types of quasi in rem cases (claims arising
from the thing and claims not arising from the thing) as being
analytically different for constitutional purposes. The discus-
" Id. at 4859 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
, The constitutional permissibility of in personam jurisdiction over corporate
directors in such actions is clearly conceded in the Folk and Moyer argument for a
preference for in personam jurisdiction. Folk and Moyer, supra note 2. -
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sion which follows examines that new theory of quasi in rem
jurisdiction and attempts to show how such a theory bears on
existing case law.
VI. TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF Quasi In Rem JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court decision in Shaffer hints at a new
theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but does not expand on the
precise dimensions of such a theory. Needed at this point,
therefore, is a comprehensive re-thinking of the basic assump-
tions of Harris v. Balk 3 in light of jurisdictional changes made
since that case was decided. The Supreme Court held in Harris
that there was no constitutional problem involved in the gar-
nishment in Maryland by Epstein of Harris' debt to Balk, pro-
vided that Balk could have sued Harris in Maryland on the
debt. If this test were still relevant to a determination of the
constitutionality of usage of quasi in rem jurisdiction, neither
Shaffer nor Gregg would have been questionable exercises of
jurisdiction. Surely the directors in Shaffer could have sued the
corporation in Delaware on any claims which they had against
the corporation. In both instances citizens of one state would
be in Delaware asserting claims against a Delaware corpora-
tion, and the existence of in personam jurisdiction over the
corporations would be, in both cases, unquestionable. But this
fact alone does not necessarily support the conclusion that
quasi in rein jurisdiction should still be available. Indeed, it is
precisely that conclusion which is stricken by the holding in
Shaffer.
In light of decisions like Mullane" and Atkinson,95 it seems
desirable to abolish, for purposes of federal due process consid-
erations, all distinctions between quasi in rem jurisdiction and
in personam jurisdiction. (It might be added that no special
consideration should be given to the relatively rare category of
jurisdiction now labeled in rem.) The effect of this would be a
holding that the test of International Shoe and its progeny is
applicable to all exercises of jurisdiction, however they may be
labeled. This is the holding in Shaffer. The necessity of the
,3 198 U.S. 215 (1908).
" Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
9s Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
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abolition of all distinctions between quasi in rem and in
personam jurisdiction would seem to be clear from trends al-
ready observed. This necessity is exemplified by the very unfair
choice with which Gregg was faced: loss of his stock or exposure
to expansive liability in an inconvenient forum. As has been
noted,96 the choice facing the directors in Shaffer did not seem
that unfair; however, it was so regarded by the Supreme Court.
To say that the distinction between quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion and in personam jurisdiction is abolished for purposes of
substantive due process is not, however, to say that quasi in
rem jurisdiction itself is abolished. Remembering that the in
personam jurisdictional dimensions of International Shoe are
merely permissive for the states and not self-implementing, a
state may still choose not to have long arm statutes which go
to the outer limits of due process in establishing in personam
jurisdiction. This will mean that there may be fact patterns in
which the state could constitutionally exercise in personam
jurisdiction but has not chosen to do so. In such fact patterns,
the state should be left with the option of providing for the
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Under these circumstan-
ces, the state would merely be using the procedure as it was
used historically-as an adjunct to in personam jurisdiction
when the claims being adjudicated do not arise from the thing
itself. The important concept to be remembered about such an
exercise is that it would not in any way transgress the basic
ideas of fairness articulated in International Shoe, since the
state would merely be utilizing a more limited form of jurisdic-
tion in a fact pattern in which it could have used the broader
form of in personam jurisdiction. Nor is there any objection to
a state's lack of provision for a limited appearance in such a
case. The fact that an appearance exposes the defendant to
expanded liability is meaningless since such exposure is consti-
tutionally permissible in the realm of in personam jurisdiction
if the state chooses to enact an appropriate long arm statute.
What is suggested, therefore, is that, in light of developments
in the area, quasi in rem jurisdiction should now be perceived
as merely a form of long arm jurisdiction. Moreover, it is an
option which should be available to the state when it falls
" See text accompanying note 87 supra.
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within the constitutional boundaries set in the cases following
International Shoe.
Traynor's use in Atkinson" of quasi in rem jurisdiction
based on the in personam minimum contacts test"8 exemplifies
the basic philosophy that quasi in rem jurisdiction is allowable
when in personam is constitutionally permissible yet statuto-
rily impossible. Yet, it would also seem that quasi in rem
should continue to be available as an option even in cases
where in personam jurisdiction is both constitutionally and
statutorily permissible. In such cases, the state would seem to
be providing and the plaintiff utilizing a procedure designed to
provide security for the action by way of prejudgment attach-
ment. Although this view has been judicially rejected else-
where,99 the utilization of attachment for security purposes
rather than for jurisdictional purposes should activate what-
ever remains of the procedural due process restraints on pre-
judgment attachment. ' This argument was rejected by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Shaffer, but in that holding the
Court was not viewing the jurisdictional exercise in the same
manner proposed here (as security through prejudgment at-
tachment). Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court deci-
sion that such protections were inapplicable should not fore-
close a utilization of quasi in rem as a means of providing
security by way of prejudgment attachment. The Supreme
Court in reversing that decision in Shaffer did not rule on this
matter. Yet, it is the viewpoint of this author that: (1) quasi
in rem can be utilized as either a jurisdictional option or as a
security option; and (2) although the application of procedural
due process restraints is beyond the scope of the present discus-
sion, such procedural safeguards should attach in cases using
the quasi in rem form for security purposes.10'
With the new philosophy that quasi in rem jurisdiction
exists simply as a procedural option open to the state in cases
,T Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
" Id. at 965.
" Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Fin. Co., 456 F.2d 979 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 843 (1972).
' The Sniadach protections were significantly restricted in Mitchell v. W. T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
"I Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J.
1023 (1973).
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in which it could constitutionally have exercised in personam
jurisdiction, a fairly surprising development can be seen in the
fact patterns in Shaffer and Gregg. Since the two cases as
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
took diametrically opposed views on the issue of the availabil-
ity of jurisdiction in the cases, it would seem that one of the
decisions must be incorrect. Such a conclusion appears to be
supported by the reversal of Shaffer by the United States Su-
preme Court. From the holding in Shaffer, it is clear that the
Supreme Court must uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in
Gregg. Clearly, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
conclusion of the Delaware Supreme Court that the in
personam jurisdictional standards had no effect in a quasi in
rem action."2 Yet, despite the fact that the Delaware Supreme
Court's rationale in Shaffer was quite different from the ration-
ale of the Third Circuit in Gregg, the result on the facts in
Shaffer in the Delaware Supreme Court was as correct as the
result on the facts in Gregg. Gregg, therefore, is the case which
should have been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court, not Shaffer.
It must be remembered that Shaffer was a stockholders'
derivative action against director-stockholders of Greyhound
for alleged mismanagement of the corporation and that the
action was taking place in a forum which was the state of
incorporation of Greyhound. There is no reason why the state
of incorporation should not constitutionally be able to exercise
in personam jurisdiction over the directors. The minimum con-
tact connecting the directors to the forum would be their ac-
ceptance of a directorship of a corporation incorporated in the
forum. Further contact would come from the fact that the
course of conduct complained of was allegedly harmful to that
corporation and that any recovery in such a suit would run to
the corporation rather than directly to the stockholders in-
volved as parties plaintiff. The interest which the state has in
the corporation which it created gives it a sufficient basis to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the directors of that cor-
poration. This is the contention, discussed earlier,"' coming
'2 45 U.S.L.W. at 4856.
18 See text accompanying note 87 supra.
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from the section of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in which he
dissented from the result on the facts in Shaffer.'"' It is men-
tioned again at this point merely to illustrate the workings of
the new theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Thus, the factual result of the holding of the Delaware
Supreme Court in Shaffer is consistent with the new philoso-
phy of quasi in rem jurisdiction which is urged here. Since
Delaware could constitutionally have exercised in personam
jurisdiction over the directors, there should. be no constitu-
tional barrier to the state's allowance of a quasi in rem proceed-
ing against the directors. The fact that there may be exposure
to excess liability by requiring the directors to come into Dela-
ware to defend their stock is of no consequence since this is
merely a liability to which the defendants could have been
constitutionally subjected in the first place. On the other hand,
it is equally clear that the holding in Gregg that the exercise
of jurisdiction there was unconstitutional is also correct under
this theory. Given the facts in that case, Gregg could not have
been subjected to in personam jurisdiction by the Delaware
courts; neither, therefore, should he have been subjected to
quasi in rem jurisdiction. Thus, it is the opinion of this author
that the Supreme Court could have better established the new
basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction by affirming Gregg, not over-
ruling Schaffer.
The philosophy espoused in this article which limits quasi
in rem jurisdiction to those situations in which in personam
jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible does not have the
drastic effect upon quasi in rem jurisdiction which could result
from a full-fledged adoption of the rationale of the Third Cir-
cuit in Gregg. Although the author is in agreement with the
result reached by the Third Circuit on the facts in Gregg, the
impact of the author's jurisdictional theory is not as far-
reaching. To understand why it is not as far-reaching requires
a recollection that quasi in rem cases have traditionally fallen
into two distinct classes: those involving claims arising from
the thing involved (clearly quasi in rem and including fact
patterns such as Atkinson'5 ) and those involving claims unre-
45 U.S.L.W. at 4858 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' 316 P.2d 960 (Cal: 1957).
[Vol. 66
QuAsI IN REM JURISDICTION
lated to the thing used as a jurisdictional base (really quasi in
personam and involving such cases as Harris."10) The new phi-
losophy relating quasi in rem to in personam will usually have
no effect on the first class of cases. The state will still be able
to exercise jurisdiction in cases where the claim arises from the
thing simply because the interest in the thing itself is a suffi-
cient contact for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction if the
state chooses to exercise it. As proof of that fact, witness how
most long arm statutes allow the exercise of in personam juris-
diction over a person who owns real property in the state so long
as the claim involved arises from the ownership of that prop-
erty.107 The Supreme Court in Shaffer recognized this ability to
adjudicate claims arising from the thing when it stated:
[Wlhen claims to the property itself are the source of the
underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is
located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defen-
dant's claim to property located in State would normally
indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protec-
tion of his interest ....
It appears, therefore, that jurisdiction over many types
of actions which now are or might be brought in rem would
not be affected by a holding that any assertion of state court
jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard.'
Thus such exercises of jurisdiction in personam as to claims
arising from things with sufficient contacts with the state
would clearly be constitutional.109 Since the state would have
the ability to act in personam in all actions in which the claim
arises from the thing, there is no reason under the new theory
to prevent adjudication quasi in rem if the state chooses to do
so. The state would simply be exercising its constitutionally
permissible powers in one form rather than in another. Consid-
ering the result in Atkinson, "I it might even be added that such
ability to adjudicate does not depend in any degree on whether
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
' UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Acr § 1.03 (1962), reprinted
supra note 60.
1 45 U.S.L.W. at 4855.
10 Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1938). Note that this holding
even pre-dates the expansion of long arm jurisdiction in International Shoe.
"1 316 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1957).
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the thing is physically present in the state. If the state has a
sufficient interest in the thing, it can adjudicate claims arising
from that thing by whatever procedural label it chooses to at-
tach.
Both the approach taken by the Third Circuit and that of
the author are therefore identical as they relate to true quasi
in rem actions. The major restrictive effect of the equation of
quasi in rem with in personam, however, is that the ability of
the state to adjudicate the rights of parties in a thing when the
claim involved does not arise from the thing will be limited.
This means simply that all exercises of quasi inpersonam juris-
diction (as it has previously been labeled in this discussion)
will have to meet the standards set by the due process cases
coming from International Shoe."' Given the purposes for
which jurisdiction is being used when the claim does not arise
from the thing, there is nothing objectionable about such a
restriction.
One result of the Supreme Court decision in Shaffer is an
overruling of the aspects of Harris v. Balk"' which allowed
quasi in personam jurisdiction. The Court itself observed that
"[flor the type of quasi in rem action typified by Harris v.
Balk and the present case, however, accepting the proposed
analysis would result in significant change."1 3 Such exercises
of jurisdiction are inconsistent with modern notions of due pro-
cess because "in cases such as Harris. . .the only role played
by the property is to provide the basis for bringing the defen-
dant into court.""' Thus, the Court asserted that "if a direct
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would vio-
late the Constitution, it would seem that an indirect assertion
of that jurisdiction should be equally impermissible.""'
The decision to limit quasi in rem jurisdiction to situations
in which in personam jurisdiction is constitutionally available
will normally have no effect upon traditional exercises of in rem
jurisdiction."' By definition, such exercises are designed to ad-
"', International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
12 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
"1 45 U.S.L.W. at 4855.
114 Id.
Id.
"' Id.
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judicate claims relating directly to the thing involved. There is
no reason why a state should not have the ability to adjudicate
the rights of non-parties as to claims arising from the thing.
What this means is that the state could bind such absent par-
ties in personam as regards claims to the property involved and
so it may bind their interest in rem. The label used does not
matter (which would seem to make the entire area now consis-
tent with the philosophy of Mullane);"' rather it is the effect
that is to be considered. It is the interests which the state has
in the property and in the claims arising from the property
which give rise to the ability to adjudicate.
VII. THE EFFECT OF JURISDICTIONAL CHANGES ON Seider v. Roth
One of the more controversial uses of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion in recent years has been that pioneered by New York in
Seider v. Roth."' The fact pattern in Seider should indicate
that the procedure employed in that case will present some
difficulties if the new theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction (limit-
ing quasi in rem jurisdiction to situations in which inpersonam
jurisdiction would be constitutionally available) is expanded to
the utmost.
In Seider a New York plaintiff wanted to sue a Canadian
defendant for damages arising from an automobile accident
which occurred in Vermont." 9 It should be clear that in this
fact pattern the New York courts could not constitutionally
have exercised in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
unless he either had chosen to appear voluntarily or had been
served with process while within the state. Instead of attempt-
ing to obtain in personam jurisdiction, however, the New York
plaintiff proceeded against the defendant in New York by
means of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Since the defendant's in-
surer did business in New York, the plaintiff attached the in-
surance obligation of the insurer in New York. It was reasoned
that since the insurer would have an obligation to pay any
judgment which was rendered against the defendant, that obli-
gation constituted a debt running from the insurer to the in-
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
" 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
" Id. at 313.
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sured and hence could be attached.' 20
A storm of protest followed Seider.'2' An objection com-
monly heard was that since New York lacked a limited appear-
ance rule, the defendant in such cases was forced to expose
himself to liability in excess of the policy limits. 22 This objec-
tion was, however, eliminated by the holding of the New York
Court of Appeals that such judgments would be limited to the
value of the policy coverage.' 2 A more substantial objection to
the procedure employed in Seider, and one which led a federal
district court to hold the procedure unconstitutional, 4 was
that attachment should not be allowed since the debt being
attached was unliquidated and was merely contingent on a
finding of liability on the part of the insured. Yet, although
these differences did on the surface distinguish the case from
Harris v. Balk,'25 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that as long as Harris v. Balk stood as good law, the Seider
procedure was constitutionally permissible.1 21 Since the United
States Supreme Court has in Shaffer overruled Harris v. Balk,
it is necessary to determine the effect of that holding on Seider.
It might be questioned whether the holding of the Second
Circuit in Minichiello v. Rosenberg'2 affirming the constitu-
tionality of the Seider technique forecloses any contention that
quasi in rem jurisdiction is available only when in personam
jurisdiction would be constitutionally permissible. It is clear
that no such possibility was considered by any of the courts
which ruled on Seider. '2 This means that the possibility of
finding Seider unconstitutional under the new theory of juris-
diction advocated in this article still exists. Yet, despite such
I" Id. at 315.
" For an example of such protest, see Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too
Many or Putting Seider Back in its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 660 (1971).
M R. WEmNT Au, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICr OF LAws 148 (1971).
121 Simpson v. Loehmann, 234 N.E.2d 669, 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967). This
decision was necessary since without such a holding it had been possible that the
insured would have lost his insurance coverage for non-cooperation had he not come
to New York to aid in defense of the action. R. WmrruR, supra note 122.
1U Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
,,5 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
22 Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968).
127 Id.
128 Even those opinions which felt Seider was unconstitutional did not rely on such
a basis for their conclusions. See Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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a possibility, it is not necessary to conclude that the new theory
or the holding in Shaffer makes the decision in Seider unconsti-
tutional.
At first glance, limiting quasi in rem to situations in which
in personam is constitutionally available would seem to require
the overturning of Seider. Certainly, the state would have been
unable to obtain long arm jurisdiction over the defendants in
Seider.'2" On the other hand, it should be clear that the Seider
type of jurisdiction is, in reality, a judicially created direct
action procedure. Since the United States Supreme Court
probably would uphold applications of direct action statutes
against insurance companies when the injury sued upon oc-
curred outside the forum and the policies involved were issued
outside the forum,1ir it is very difficult to conclude that Seider
could be unconstitutional. If the legislative branch of a state
can create a direct action possibility for its citizens, it is absurd
to think that the judicial branch cannot do likewise by creating
a procedural device for implementing a course of action already
in existence. By simply recognizing that the insurance com-
pany is the real defendant in such actions, whether the actions
be in personam under a direct action statute or quasi in rem
by attaching the contingent liability, the result in Seider is
consistent with the new theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
Viewed in this light, Seider merely used quasi in rem as a
procedure for attacking the insurance company in a situation
where in personam jurisdiction was constitutionally permissi-
ble but statutorily unavailable. 131 This usage is not only permit-
ted under the new theory of quasi in rem jurisdiction, but the
Seider technique illustrates the intended workings of such a
theory.
I" See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Simpson v. Loeh-
mann, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
I" That direct action statutes are constitutional is the indication given by Judge
Fuld in Simpson v. Loehmann, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967), and
the implication of Judge Desmond in Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (1966).
M See Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), for the propo-
sition that in personam jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible in such a case. In
Watson suit was brought for injuries suffered in the forum.
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VIII. Shaffer AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
Still remaining for consideration are the implications of
Shaffer which reach into the choice of law process. In this re-
spect two aspects of the decision are particularly intriguing.
First, the portions of the opinion which reject the basic territo-
rialist notions of Pennoyer have implications in the area of
conflicts; second, the portions of the opinion quoted earlier
which deal with the correct application of law in the fact pat-
tern of Shaffer (although such portions of the opinion are
clearly dicta) are of importance in considering the relationship
between the due process controls over choice of law (legislative
jurisdiction) and those over adjudicatory authority (judicial
jurisdiction).
The implications of rejecting the territorialist foundations
of Pennoyer are obvious to anyone who has studied conflicts in
the United States. The territorialist underpinnings of Pennoyer
had their counterparts in the choice of law process. 3 2 Although
the territorialist theory of conflicts has, in large part, been
intellectually discredited in this country for some period of
time, a substantial number of jurisdictions still retain territori-
alist notions as the basis of their vested rights choice of law
systems.'TM It would seem, however, that if the territorialist
notions of due process have once and for all been laid to rest
in the area of judicial jurisdiction, it would make a good deal
of sense to lay them to rest in the area of legislative jurisdiction
as well. Although the United States Supreme Court has not for
a considerable period of time heard a conflicts case, the time
is ripe now for the Court to enter that field once more and to
extend Shaffer into the choice of law area. An extension of
Shaffer into the conflicts area would simply recognize that
states can no more apply their own law based on territorial
connections than they can exercise jurisdiction based on such
connections. It is suggested here that the theoretical underpin-
' Those territorialist notions were embodied in RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CONFLICr
OF LAws (1934).
"I The United States Supreme Court has long accepted territorial connection as
a sufficient basis for making a particular choice of law. See, e.g., Carrol v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408 (1955). R. WErmmUB, supra note 122, at 234, however, indicates a rejection
of vested rights in 21 jurisdictions. Since that statement is 6 years old, it is likely that
more states have since abandoned vested rights.
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ning of both legislative and judicial jurisdiction should be the
same since the control of both areas comes from due process.
Territorialism should be rejected.
Yet, if the philosophical foundations of both jurisdiction
and conflicts reject territorialism, will the due process controls
over choice of law necessarily be coextensive with the due pro-
cess controls over judicial jurisdiction? As an initial reaction it
appears that due process controls over choice of law should be
more stringent than controls over judicial jurisdiction. In other
words, it would seem that a state ought to have more connec-
tion with an action before it could apply its own law than would
be necessary simply for it to act as a forum. 1 4 At most, it would
seem that the due process controls over the two areas should
be coextensive. 13 In no circumstance would it seem that a state
would have the ability to apply its own law but would lack
sufficient due process connections to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion. Yet this is exactly the import of a portion of the dicta of
the Supreme Court in Shaffer.
In the majority opinion in Shaffer, it was noted:
The interests appellee has identified may support the appli-
cation of Delaware law to resolve any controversy over appel-
lants' action in their capacities as officers and directors. But
we have rejected the argument that if a State's law can pro-
perly be applied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have juris-
diction over the parties to that dispute.3'
Despite having held in Shaffer that the Delaware courts were
without jurisdiction over the defendant directors, this quota-
tion from the Court clearly indicates the majority felt the state
had sufficient interest in the litigation to apply its own law.
This, in turn, would indicate that an application of Delaware
law to the controversy would not be violative of the due process
control set by such cases as Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. 17 In
"1 It would hardly seem accidental that the major due process case controlling the
choice of law process involved a fact situation in which the state could not constitution-
ally obtain in personam jurisdiction. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Jurisdiction in that case was obtained by garnishment of reinsurance agreements is-
sued by insurers doing business in Texas.
'u Indeed, the position has been taken that the two lines of control have been
converging into one. R. LEFLAR, AmERcAN CON.acrs LAw 122 (1968).
" 45 U.S.L.W. at 1485.
" 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964);
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
fact, the dicta of the Court in Shaffer is quite similar to lan-
guage contained in Hanson v. Denckla. "I In that case, the
Court had indicated that the state of Florida had insufficient
contact to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a Delaware trus-
tee, yet that Florida law would be the correct law to be applied
to the underlying controversy."' If taken literally, this would
mean that it is possible for a state to have sufficient contact to
satisfy due process controls for choice of law purposes, yet lack
sufficient contact to satisfy due process control over judicial
jurisdiction. However, it is not necessary to take the language
in either Shaffer or Hanson literally.
As to the Hanson decision, it might first be noted that the
trustee over whom Florida lacked jurisdiction was at most a
nominal party to the litigation. Indeed, the Court itself noted
that but for requirements of state law, there was no reason why
the litigation in that case should not proceed without the trus-
tee.140 Under those circumstances, it is hardly surprising that
the state of Florida had sufficient contacts to apply its own law
as to the nominal party for choice of law purposes, but lacked
sufficient contact to apply its own law for jurisdictional pur-
poses. As to parties more substantially connected with the liti-
gation process, it would appear doubtful that a state would
ever have sufficient contact to apply its own law, yet lack suffi-
cient contact to exercise jurisdiction.
The portion of the opinion in Shaffer dealing with the
relationship of choice of law to jurisdiction can be regarded as
unfortunately included. Since there would appear to be noth-
ing in the controversy which required the Court to make the
types of statements outlined above, it would not be at all unfair
to characterize those portions of the Court's decision as gratui-
tous. If, as has been contended, the state of Delaware did in-
deed have sufficient contact to exercise in personam jurisdic-
tion over the defendant directors,' then there would be no
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
1- 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
1I9 Id.
14 Id. at 254.
,, The reasons why the state of Delaware should have been held to have in
personam jurisdiction have already been discussed at length, both in this article (see
text accompanying notes 80-92 supra) and in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan. 45
U.S.L.W. at 4858 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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divergence between the choice of law limitations and the juris-
dictional limitations.
A comparison of the different due process controls can
better be drawn from Gregg than from Shaffer. As has been
suggested earlier, 1 2 it was Gregg which was the easier of the two
decisions, since it would appear that under no test could in
personam jurisdiction have been exercised over Gregg. It would
also appear that under no test of due process controls over
choice of law could the law of the state of Delaware have been
applied to the fact pattern in Gregg, since that fact pattern
bears strong resemblances to Home Insurance Co. v. Dick.'43
Given that similarity, any attempt to apply Delaware law to
the Gregg fact pattern would probably have been unconstitu-
tional.
The' entire area of the relationship between the due process
controls over judicial jurisdiction and the due process controls
over legislative jurisdiction would seem at this point to be ripe
for reevaluation by the Supreme Court. Such an evaluation
would better be made in a fact pattern in which legislative
jurisdiction was actively contested. Attempts to formulate a
test in fact patterns where only judicial jurisdiction is ques-
tioned is futile. The core concept of the two areas of control
would appear to be the same. For the time being, therefore, it
is wise to ignore the suggestions of the Court in both Shaffer
and Hanson that states having sufficient contact for legislative
jurisdiction may lack sufficient contact for judicial jurisdic-
tion. This is a question best answered in the future, and it is
hoped the question will be answered in a manner different from
that which has been indicated in the dicta in both the above
cases.
CONCLUSION: FINAL REFLECTIONS ON Shaffer
It is difficult only a short while after the decision of the
"I See text accompanying note 102 supra for a discussion of why Gregg was the
case which should have been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
'- 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In Home Insurance, a contract to insure a boat in Mexican
waters was issued in Mexico. All facts relevant to the contract took place outside
Texas, which later became the forum for a suit on the insurance. The Court held that
Texas could not apply its law to invalidate a policy provision limiting the time for
bringing suit.
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United States Supreme Court in Shaffer to put that decision
into perspective; any decision of that magnitude will be clearly
seen only in the future. A summation of what the decision does
is staggering. The decision overrules Harris v. Balk, rebuts sub-
stantial portions of the dicta in Pennoyer v. Neff, and destroys
the territorialist underpinnings of judicial jurisdiction. It works
a substantial change over the law of judicial jurisdiction as it
has been accepted in this country for the past 100 years. The
implications of the decision for areas other than judicial juris-
diction are equally staggering. Further clarification of the area
is still needed and, in particular, it is to be hoped that the
Court will clarify the relationship between legislative jurisdic-
tion and judicial jurisdiction.
